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Despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on 
prices, I show that European consumers perceive the contrary. The data indicate that 
consumers based their perceptions about inflation on goods that are frequently purchased. 
I use this insight to develop and estimate a model of imperfect information that explains 
why these goods were subject to higher price growth after the changeover. The data 
indicate that Spain, Italy and France show a stronger euro-effect on prices. The data also 
suggest that this price growth is correlated with consumers’ ability to adapt to the new 
currency.  
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Despite economists' expectations that the introduction of the euro (€) currency
in 1999 would have no e®ect on price levels, most citizens of the European Union
believe that the transition to the euro triggered substantial price increases. In this
paper I address the question of whether the introduction of the euro had an e®ect
on prices, both perceived and real.
Given that the exchange rates were ¯xed long before the new currency was in-
troduced, economic theory tells us that on January 1st, 2002 the euro changeover
should have had almost no e®ect on consumer behavior. The euro was launched
on January 1st, 1999 as an electronic currency in the eleven participating Mem-
ber States1. At this stage of the European Monetary Union the exchange rates
of the participating currencies were ¯xed, while on the ¯rst of January 2002 the
euro became legal tender, and about 300 million EU citizens started using the new
currency2.
Prices might have adjusted slightly due to the disappearance of commission fees,
but this adjustment should have caused a slight decrease in prices, not an increase.
The introduction of the euro might also have caused a slight increase in prices due
to menu costs, but this e®ect was thought to be low3. In short, there was no reason
to observe a signi¯cant increase in actual and perceived in°ation.
In reality, most of the citizens of the European Union think that the introduction
of the euro has triggered a price increase. In Germany the euro is sometimes typically
1Greece joined the system on January 1st, 2001
2For a general overview of the euro and the literature related to the euro see Corsetti (n.d.)
3A survey among businesses organized by the National Bank of Belgium shows, that among the
companies that had a price increase after the euro the impact of the menu costs of the euro were
quite marginal. In fact, they represent the least important factor (Survey on the Introduction of
the Euro (2002)).
2called the Teuro. \Teuer" means costly. In fact the data in table 1 indicate that
perceived in°ation did grow more than actual in°ation. As a consequence, the
di®erence between perceived and actual in°ation has increased in the euro countries
signi¯cantly. Among the non-euro countries only Sweden had a a bigger di®erence
after 2002, while for all other non-euro countries it actually became smaller.
These observations should be striking for economists. There are two important
reasons for analyzing the changeover. First, other European countries remain outside
the euro zone and no doubt will consider joining in the future. Understanding both
perceived and actual price dynamics of those who did join is critical for the rational
decisions of those considering entry. Second, the introduction of the euro provides a
natural experiment which allows tests of more general models of economic behavior
and price setting.
There have been few attempts to explain the observed patterns of in°ation in
the euro zone. One possible explanation for the increase in perceived in°ation is
the rounding e®ect. Consumers tend to round the exchange rate to compare current
and past prices. In Italy the exchange rate is 1,936.27 lire for one euro. If consumers
use an exchange rate of 2,000 this can bias perceived in°ation by about 3%. This
explanation, suggested by Biggeri (Istat: L'in°azione percepita al 6% (8 October
2003)), the head of the Italian Statistical Institute, is, however, rejected by the
data. This theory implies that in some euro countries there should have been no
increase in perceived in°ation because the rounding worked in the opposite direction,
which is not true. The twelve euro-countries in fact have di®erent exchange rates
with di®erent approximation errors (table 2).4 According to Biggeri's claim, only
a negative approximation error would generate a positive gap between perceived
4The approximation errors are based on a study conducted by an Italian economic institute (Le
previsioni per l'economia italiana (2003)).
3and actual in°ation. However, examples of Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium
contradict this idea (table 1). They have a positive approximation error and should
therefore have perceived in°ation growing less then the actual one. However, this is
not the case.
The main aim of this paper is to study the mechanism of the impact of the euro
on prices and perceived in°ation. This is done by putting some structure on the
statistical analysis using a theoretical model. There are several questions I address:
1. Is there any e®ect of the euro on prices?
2. If there is an e®ect on prices, why is it the case? In particular, why did some
goods have much higher in°ation than others?
3. Why did perceived in°ation grow so much?
In order to explain a changeover e®ect on in°ation, actual and perceived, it is
necessary to go beyond the perfect information and no-frictions economy framework.
In such an economy nominal changes have no real e®ect.
The starting point of my analysis is a conjecture by the European Central Bank
(Recent developments in consumers' in°ation perceptions (2002)) that, after the
introduction of the euro, consumers based their estimation of price increases on
goods that are purchased more frequently5. In°ation patterns for di®erent types
of goods show that in°ation was in fact higher for goods that are cheaper and are
purchased by customers more often. As will be made clear later, this is consistent
with a model of consumers with incomplete information.
I study the question of why a di®erence in in°ation patterns for di®erent goods
may arise and conjecture that the reason for higher in°ation among cheap goods is
5See also Guiso (25 February 2003)
4the cost of obtaining information.
I build a theoretical model that assumes consumers have computational limita-
tions in both, converting prices to their old and familiar currency and optimizing
their utility under price uncertainty. To make optimal consumption choices they
need to express everything in the old-currency units, as they remember their income
and prices of other products in this medium. When seeing a price in euros they have
only a vague idea of how much it is in their old currency. They may ¯nd this out
by converting the price, however this is costly. It is also costly to perform the op-
timization under price uncertainty. For simplicity I assume that both costs are the
same, then if the cost of conversion exceeds the expected loss of not adjusting the
consumption optimally, consumers will not convert the price and buy an old bundle.
The uncertainty about the old-currency-equivalent of the price in euros is higher
the higher the price in euros is. Therefore the loss of utility is higher the higher the
initial price of the product. That implies that consumers will convert prices more
often for those goods, and adjust demand accordingly. This consumer behavior pro-
vides an incentive for rational ¯rms to exploit this phenomenon by increasing prices
for products for which the conversion is not optimal.
In other words, the changeover to a new currency reduces the information about
prices available to the consumer. Such an interpretation of the problem closely
relates this model to models of consumer behavior with incomplete information.
The euro introduces a cost of conversion which closely resembles search costs faced
by buyers that look for the seller with the lowest price.
There are many models of consumer behavior that attempt to capture the im-
plications of costly information for price determination, but it has been di±cult to
provide convincing empirical tests of them. Diamond (1971), in a very in°uential
5paper, shows that even small search costs could result in non-competitive outcomes.
In another theoretical paper, Salop & Stiglitz (1977) assume that consumers have
heterogenous costs of gathering information. This assumption can generate an equi-
librium with price dispersion, but Diamonds' unique monopoly price equilibrium
may still hold when there are high enough information costs. Braverman (1980)
generalizes the former model allowing for U-shaped cost functions and a continuous
distribution of the cost of information.
Starting with the seminal paper by Pratt, Wise & Zeckhauser (1979), empirical
work has mainly looked at price dispersion, not due to product di®erentiation, to
test these models. Interesting studies in the food industry have shown that provid-
ing consumers with information can lower prices (among others Devine & Marion
(1979)). Many recent papers have tried to measure if the introduction of the In-
ternet, which considerably reduces search costs, reduces price dispersion (see for
example Baylis & Perlo® (2002)).
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I shortly present the data about
actual-perceived in°ation discrepancy and outline the formal model. Section 3 deals
with the empirical speci¯cation. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
There is a wide consensus that perceived in°ation grew much faster than actual
in°ation following the introduction of the euro. Indices of perceived in°ation are
usually based on di®erences between positive and negative opinions about the level of
in°ation. It is therefore impossible to interpret the crude di®erence between actual
and perceived in°ation. Nevertheless, changes of this di®erence over time should
be less prone to comparability issues. The data are based on the European Union
6Business and Consumer Surveys (Eur (2004)) and Eurostat's annual harmonized
consumer price index.
Figures 1 and 2 represent a way to show this change over time. They plot
perceived versus actual in°ation in all EU countries. Di®erent labels have been
used to distinguish the pre-euro from the post-euro period in order to highlight the
change after the changeover. In most countries that participated in the currency
union the break is striking, and pre and post changeover scatters can be fairly easily
distinguished. On the other side there is no e®ect in Sweden, United Kingdom
and Denmark, countries that have not yet adopted the euro (¯gure 2). Table 1
shows the di®erence between the standardized perceived and the actual in°ation in
all 15 countries, both before and after the introduction of the new currency. The
same table also shows the perceived in°ation index. Again, it is important to note
that while the simple di®erence between perceived (a qualitative index) and actual
in°ation (a quantitative index) cannot be easily interpreted the change over time
should be meaningful. Looking at the change between the ¯rst and the second
column it can be seen the di®erence between actual and perceived in°ation grew,
and this e®ect did not occur to such extent in non-euro European countries. The
last two columns show the big increase in perceived in°ation.
These patterns suggest that consumers based their perceptions on goods that
were purchased more frequently, were cheaper and had higher price increases (Re-
cent developments in consumers' in°ation perceptions (2002)). I propose a model
that may explain why cheaper goods may be more subject to price increases after
a currency changeover. In the model consumers are rational but have a cost of
processing information.
72.1 General model
Before the euro is introduced the consumer knows her income and prices expressed
in old currency, say lire, and maximizes her utility. Once the euro is introduced,
the consumer does not observe the price in lire (p) anymore. She observes the price
in euros (pe). Let e be the exchange rate, therefore, the price expressed in lire is
pee = p¤.
It is reasonable to assume that consumers do not calculate the prices in euros
perfectly. Consumers observe the price in lire with an error. I assume that the higher
the price of a good is the higher the mistake is, that is the error-ridden lire-price is
e p = p
¤(1 + ²)
I claim that this is a very reasonable assumption. First, consumers learn to convert
small numbers faster as these are the numbers they deal with in every day life. If
the bus ticket costs 2 euros, and its price in lire did not change, consumers can
learn quickly how much 2 euros is. However, when asked how much 5000 euros are,
they have very little information to base the answer upon; they are likely to make a
higher mistake. The above assumption about the error term can also be interpreted
as if the consumer was using an approximate conversion rate, e¤ = e(1 + ²).
A di±cult exchange rate will induce the consumer to make a higher mistake if
she does not convert prices precisely. ² may depend on the consumer's familiarity
with the euro, her abilities, etc. The worse memory and analytical skills are, the
higher the variance of the error term should be. The e®ect of prices on the error
term will be discussed later.
If consumers do not know the relative prices in euros, they can act in three
8ways. First, they can convert the price into their old currency, the one they used to
remember prices. In this way they eliminate all the uncertainty related to the price
and can optimize their consumption bundle. The other two options are either to
optimize under price uncertainty, or to stick to their previous consumption bundle.
I assume that both the conversion and the optimization under price uncertainty
involve a computation that is costly. I further assume for simplicity this cost to
be k. This cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of time spent on doing
the computation or as the cost of mental activity. Later in the text I will call this
cost, the cost of conversion. The assumptions of the model imply that the consumer
prefers to convert the price into her old currency over performing the optimization
under price uncertainty.
I will show that the price growth due to currency change will be a decreasing
function of the initial price. Let us consider two goods that in equilibrium are
consumed in the same quantity. The quantity consumed initially has to be ¯xed in
order to isolate the e®ect on prices per transaction. It may be argued that cheaper
goods are bought more frequently. However, converting the price once, does not
mean that the consumer will remember it the next time she buys this good. She
will have to incur the conversion cost every time she makes a purchase.
To avoid dealing with income e®ects and keep things simple I assume that, when
making decision about how much of a given good to buy, the agent's utility is quasi-
linear in this good. This situation can be interpreted as one in which two di®erent
consumers, with the same income, buy two di®erent goods.
9The demand for good x1 is the solution of the problem
maxx1;y1u(x1) + y1
s.t. p1x1 + y1 = m ;
and the demand for good x2 is the solution of
maxx2;y2µu(x2) + y2
s.t. p2x2 + y2 = m :
Without loss of generality assume that µ > 1. In order to have an equal demand
^ x1 = ^ x2 = ^ x, it can be shown that p2 = µp1.
In this limited information setup, after the changeover to the euro, the ¯rm will
increase its prices. As an extreme case, suppose that all consumers do the conversion.
Then, by the pro¯t maximization assumption, it is optimal for the ¯rm to keep the
price at pre-changeover level. On the other side, if consumers do not convert, and
buy the same bundle they used to buy before the changeover, the ¯rms optimal
strategy is clearly to increase prices. In fact, the ¯rm will set the price so that the
consumer is indi®erent between converting the price to lire and not converting. In
terms of utilities the following equalities have to be satis¯ed:
u(^ x) ¡ ^ xp
¤
1 = EV (e p1) ¡ k and µu(^ x) ¡ ^ xp
¤
2 = EV (e p2) ¡ k:
The terms on the left hand side represent the expected utilities when the consumer
does not convert and sticks to her previous optimal consumption plan, while the
utilities on the right hand side represent the expected indirect utility functions
10(EV (p) ¡ k) when the conversion that costs k is carried out and the consumption
bundle gets updated. Solving this model I get the prediction about price growth
due to the changeover.
Theorem. 0 · ¼¤
2 < ¼¤
1, that is the more expensive good has a lower price growth.
Proof. The ¯rst inequality follows from the previous discussion. First, let me show
that p¤
2 < µp¤




















By contradiction. Assume that p¤
2 = µp¤
1. Then µu(x) ¡ xµp¤
1 = µEV (e p1) ¡ µk is
equal to µu(x)¡xp¤
2. But µEV (e p1)¡µk < µEV (e p1)¡k and by the quasi-convexity
of the indirect utility function µEV (e p1)¡k · EV (µe p1)¡k = EV (e p2)¡k. Therefore
µu(x) ¡ xp¤
2 < EV (e p2) ¡ k. That means that for p¤
2 = µp¤
1 the consumer prefers to
convert the price, which is not optimal for the ¯rm. Therefore the ¯rm will decrease
p¤
2. By similar reasoning I can show that p¤
2 cannot be greater than µp¤
1.
2.2 Quadratic utility function
As a special case, assume the consumer has a quadratic utility function6:
U(x;y) = ¡:5(x ¡ a)
2 + y
That implies a linear demand ^ x = a ¡ p and the following indirect utility function
V (p;m) = ¡:5p2 + m ¡ p(a ¡ p). For simplicity I assume that ² » N(0;¾), so that
e p » N(pee;pee¾).
Recall, that ¯rm will set the highest price possible while trying to keep con-
sumer from converting. The expected utility loss from not converting is ¢(pee) =
6The choice is mainly due to it's tractability when dealing with expected indirect utility func-
tions.
11E[U(x(pee);y(pee)) ¡ U(x(p0);y(p0))]
For a quadratic function, ¢(¢) takes the form
¢(pee) = E(¡:5e p
2 + m ¡ e p(a ¡ e p) + :5p
2
0 ¡ m + e p(a ¡ p0))
= :5
Z




2 + :5(p0 ¡ pee)
2 (1)
¢(pee) is an average between the variance and the squared bias. It is higher the
higher the precision of consumer perception (¾) is.
Consumers have a probability distribution over prices but they also have the
choice of spending k (in terms of utility) to observe prices without error. Assume
that the cost di®ers across people, ki(¾), and is distributed G(¢). I assume that the
cost is a function of the variance of the consumer's error when she observes prices. It
is reasonable to assume that when the variance goes to zero, the cost of conversion
goes to zero as well. In other words, if the mistake is in¯nitesimal then the cost to
get rid of the in¯nitesimal mistake should also be close to zero.
For each i it is possible to ¯nd a threshold price in euros ¹ pe above which the












Subtracting and dividing by p0 I get the price growth
12¼i(p0) =















Notice that given the assumption that lim¾!0 ki(¾) = 0, when ¾ = 0 the thresh-
old price is the initial price itself.
The ¯rm maximizes pro¯ts. For homogenous consumers the ¯rm would set prices
according to equation 2. In this way it would face the same demand while charging
higher prices. In equation (2) price growth is a decreasing function of the initial
price, p0. The reason for that is the following. When facing a high price in euros
the consumer may incur a high cost if she does not convert the price. Given that
the consumer is likely to perform the conversion, the ¯rm, in order to avoid a lower
demand than optimal, keeps the price at the pre-euro level.
While equation 2 represents the optimal price set by the ¯rm when consumers
bear the same cost of conversion it is interesting to analyze how the optimal price
changes if I introduce heterogeneity in k. The ¯rm's objective in the textbook
model would be simply to maximize pro¯ts given the consumer demand. Assume
for simplicity a constant marginal cost. The ¯rm solves:




The optimal price in lire is pee¤ = a+c
2 . Adding the conversion problem the ¯rm
cannot do worse. After the price is set, consumers fall into one of two groups: those
who do conversion and those who do not. Therefore the problem of the ¯rm is the
13following:











Theorem. Assuming that functions are smooth, after the introduction of the euro,
it is optimal for the ¯rm to set a price which is higher than the initial price.
Proof. The ¯rms problem is:


















(^ x(pee) ¡ ^ x0)
3
5
= n(pee ¡ c)(a ¡ p0 + G(¢(pee))(p0 ¡ pee)) (4)
The ¯rst order condition (FOC) with respect to pee is
n[a ¡ p0 + G(¢(pee))(p0 + c ¡ 2pee) + (pee ¡ c)(G
0(¢(pee))¢
0(pee)(p0 ¡ pee))] = 0
or, since ¢0(pee) = ¡(a+c
2 ¡ pee) and p0 = a+c
2
a ¡ c














I > 0 II < 0 III < 0
(5)
It can be shown that there exists an equilibrium price and it is higher than p0, the
optimal price before the currency changeover. If I set pee = p0, then III = 0 and






> 0 , G(¢(p0)) < 1 (6)
In other words, unless every consumer reoptimizes doing the conversion, G(¢(p0)) <
1 and the ¯rm can do better than putting p = p0. On the other hand, as p ! 1,
II and III go to minus in¯nity, so it is optimal to decrease the price. Notice that
these results do not depend on a particular distribution function G(¢).
A very simple but useful extension of the model is to assume that ki depends on
some individual characteristics zi. Since an increase in G(¢(pee)) increases pro¯ts,
¯rms that deal with consumers who have a higher cost of conversion are better o®.
3 Empirical Speci¯cation
In order to test the economic model it would be optimal to work with price levels
based on microdata, i.e. on the original price information collected in the single re-
tailers. An alternative is to work with the least aggregated data, Eurostat's monthly
harmonized consumer price indices (HICP). In year 1995 an EU Council Regulation
required Member States to compile monthly Consumer Price Indices on a harmo-
nized basis from January 1997 onwards. The main purpose was to get comparable
indices for the EU countries. The consumer price index is a measure of the general
relative change of the prices of goods and services used by households for private
consumption. In order to measure just the price change, weights are ¯xed over time
(Laspeyres-type index, Compendium of HICP reference documents (2001)). These
data contain information on 93 di®erent aggregated items. The major drawback is
that all the information about price levels is lost.
15To test the model I match these data with information about price levels ex-
tracted from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The EIU collects, on a yearly
basis, prices of several goods in several cities around the world. The Economist
Intelligence Unit researchers collect information about prices twice a year (How are
prices gathered (n.d.)). Survey prices are gathered and listed from three types of
stores: supermarkets, medium-priced retailers, and more expensive speciality shops.
Only outlets, where items of internationally comparable quality are available for
normal sale, are visited.
The statistical design is weak, but the purpose of these data is to measure price
level for di®erent groups of products. In order to gain precision, prices have been
averaged out every time multiple information was available. As a speci¯cation check,
the models have been estimated using price averages over the entire time period
available with almost no changes in the results. Splitting the post-euro period into
more periods adds noise to the coe±cients. Table 3 brie°y depicts the main limits
of the data.
The time frequency and the items covered match partially. I manage to combine
45 items from the Eurostat data (circa half of the data) with prices in levels from the
EIU data. The match and all the items are listed in table 7, while table 8 shows the
corresponding summary statistics. The information from the EIU is used by aver-
aging over items and cities every time prices for multiple items and/or cities match
one item from the Eurostat data. This procedure attenuates possible measurement
errors.
The empirical speci¯cation relies on equation 2, which can be fairly well approx-
16imated using




This can be seen by looking at ¯gure 3 where both simulated in°ation (based on
equation 2) and ¯tted in°ation are plotted against price. A fairly broad combination
of ¾ and k allows the distance between the two functions to be small and the
approximation to be good.
I use this particular equation for two main reasons. There is no closed form
solution for the equilibrium price in equation (5), while equation (2) is simple and
still represents the ¯rms optimal price increase when consumers have homogenous
costs of conversion.
In order to control for di®erent pricing policies, price controls, di®erent market
structure and di®erent exchange rates, I allow the costs of conversion to di®er across
countries. I estimate equation (7) separately for each country. I also estimate the
model for three non-euro countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark) in
order to have estimates from a comparison group. The model predicts no e®ect
of the changeover in these countries. It is implicitly assumed that international
trade does not have a sizeable e®ect. No distinction is made and can be made with
statistical precision given the data between tradable and non tradable goods.
Item speci¯c (j) price growth will not depend only on the absolute price, but also
on seasonal, cyclical and other exogenous factors, including demand and supply. I
incorporate these factors in the model assuming additivity. The seasonal component
¼s, the good speci¯c ¯xed component ® and the exogenous factors, observable (1=p)
17and not (e), give rise to the model:
¼j;t;c = ¼j;s;c + ®j;c + ¯t;c
1
pj;t;c
+ ej;t;c ; (8)
¯t;c = g(t;Xc) : (9)
I expect ¯ to decrease over time (t), and to depend on variables that are country
speci¯c (Xc). Most of these variables come from the 2002 Eurobarometer. This
survey is based on approximately 1000 interviews per Member State7. The 2002
survey mostly covers issues related to the introduction of the euro. Information
extracted from this source always uses the appropriate sample weights.
Given this model and the format of the data, the estimation is done in two steps.
First, I estimate equation (8), then I compare the estimated coe±cients with data
that may be contained in Xc, like the fraction of consumers that do not think in
euros and still convert the price from euros to the old currency.
The ¯rst step starts with dealing with seasonality and trends of prices. The
assumption is that seasonal e®ects and trends are fairly constant over time, but
di®erent for di®erent countries and di®erent goods. This should not be too far from
the truth, especially given that the data span not more than six years, therefore,
I include 12 monthly dummy variables for each good (sub-index) in each country.
Seasonally adjusting the data means being statistically conservative, since this is
likely to capture only part of the euro e®ect.
A problem with the introduction of the euro is that the time pattern of its e®ect
on in°ation is not clear. The static model does not address this issue, while the
empirical one does by allowing the e®ect ¯ to depend on time. On one side, ¯rms
7Except Germany 2000, Luxembourg 600, United Kingdom 1300 including 300 in Northern
Ireland
18may need some time to learn that consumers observe prices with noise; on the other
side, consumers learn and adapt to the new currency. Buyers ¯rst learn to convert
more e±ciently and ¯nally switch completely to the new currency. They slowly
memorize prices in euros and are able to judge how appropriate prices set by the
sellers are, this time without the need of converting to the old currency.
Moreover, there was a dual circulation period of two months at the time of the
changeover. A survey of 2,605 businesses in Belgium (Survey on the Introduction of
the Euro (2002)) carried out in January 2002 shows in fact that about half of them
used dual pricing. The number goes up to 95% for the retail trade. Unfortunately
60% of these retailers did not know (50%) or did not want to answer (10%) how
long they would keep the dual pricing. Twenty percent said they would keep it for
two months. This simply con¯rms that it is hard to ¯x a date for the changeover
e®ect.
Once demeaned and deseasonalized, in°ation depends on the inverse of price
levels and on unobservables, such as demand and supply. Unfortunately monthly
data on item-speci¯c consumption is not available. Before the changeover it should
be uncontroversial to assume that in general price levels and supply and demand
factors are uncorrelated across di®erent goods. If this is the case, even not controlling
for them will yield unbiased estimates. Unfortunately this may not be true after the
changeover. Demand for cheaper goods may be reduced by the fraction of consumers
who do the exact conversion and notice a price increase.
Given this positive relationship between price and changes in consumption, the
estimated e®ect of prices on in°ation will be upward (downward) biased if changes in
consumption and in°ation are negatively (positively) correlated and I do not control
19for changes in consumption8.
As proxy for consumption I use the weights used to calculate the overall in°ation
index. Each year these weights are based on the income shares spent in that sub-
index the year before. Assuming that most of the variability comes from the change
in consumption and not the change in prices and income, I can try to control for
consumption using this proxy. When I do this, both using levels and changes, the
results (not shown) remain basically unchanged, and the coe±cient on weights is
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. If the proxy works, this would suggest that
there is no bias of this sort in my estimates.
As an alternative solution all regressions have been estimated using lagged values
of prices as an instrument. This could solve both, the aforementioned bias due
to omitted variables and the measurement error problem due to the non-scienti¯c
design of the EIU data. Results, because of the very high correlation over time of
prices, are almost unchanged and are therefore not reported. Reliability ratios vary
between 89% and 98%. This may also depend on non-classical measurement errors
since EIU analysts may be biased by the price reported in the previous period.
The estimated variance covariance matrix of the errors allows for heterogeneity
over time and goods and dependence over goods by clustering the forty-six items into
thirteen di®erent groups. The groups are displayed in table 7. Once detrended there
is no apparent autocorrelation. Moving away from the identically and independently
distributed errors assumption slightly increases the standard errors, especially in the
speci¯cations that try to estimate more °exible time-varying coe±cients.
Table 9 shows the estimated coe±cients of the ¯rst regression model, while ta-
ble 11 helps in interpreting the size of the e®ect of the seasonally adjusted model
8Assume the model: ¼ = ®¢c + ¯ 1
p + e, then plimb ¯ = ¯ +
cov(²;1=p)
var(1=p) = ¯ +
®cov(¢c;1=p)
var(1=P) > ¯ if
® is negative
20by expressing the estimated e®ect of the changeover in terms of yearly in°ation. In
this case the post-euro coe±cient measures the e®ect after the introduction of the
euro, while the pre-euro is expected to be close to zero9.
Detrended seasonally-unadjusted (¯rst two columns) and adjusted (last two
columns) monthly price growth is regressed on the inverse of price and the in-
verse of price after the changeover. This model assumes a constant coe±cient for
the period after the introduction of the euro. The coe±cient measures the addi-
tional e®ect of the inverse of price on monthly in°ation after the changeover. A
di®erence-in-di®erence estimator can be derived by simply comparing euro coun-
tries versus non-euro countries. This exercise is not performed, mainly because the
control groups estimates would add unnecessary noise to estimates of the changeover
e®ect.
There are some reasons to prefer this pooled e®ect over more °exible speci¯-
cations. First, as already mentioned, consumers and ¯rms may need some time to
learn to deal with euros, with opposite e®ects on prices. Second, averaging the e®ect
over the one-and-a-half years after the introduction represents a statistically con-
servative way of estimating the e®ect. Estimates are less susceptible to short term
shocks like \hard winters" or mad cow disease. I already mentioned that consumers
may switch mentally to the new currency only very slowly. Firms, as well, may
not be immediately aware of the consumers di±culties. The e®ect could therefore
persist over time.
As expected, the coe±cients of the inverse of price over the entire period are not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. On the contrary, three of the twelve euro countries,
Italy, France and Spain, have a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on the inverse of
9More formally ¯t = ¯0 + ¯11(post €), where 1(post €) is an indicator function equal to one
after the euro was introduced and zero otherwise
21price after the changeover. Table 11 shows the size of the e®ect in terms of yearly
in°ation. So, for example, goods that cost the equivalent of one dollar in Spain had
on average a euro-related price increase of 2.66%. Germany and the Netherlands
have a relatively big coe±cient too, but with a t-statistic close to one.
There seems to be a relationship between the coe±cients and the gap between
perceived and real in°ation. Not surprisingly big gaps lead to big coe±cients and
vice-versa. Countries without a gap do not show any signi¯cant e®ect of the in-
verse of price on price growth. What this means is that higher perceived in°ation
goes together with higher in°ation of low-priced goods. Perceived in°ation and its
di®erence between the post and the pre-euro period are positively correlated with
the coe±cients too. This is coherent with the idea that consumers may base their
predictions on cheaper and more frequently purchased goods.
Notice that the e®ects remain signi¯cant for two countries if I use seasonally
adjusted data. As a comparison group I added three countries that did not par-
ticipate in the currency union: Denmark, Sweden, and United Kingdom. All their
coe±cients are close to zero or even have the wrong sign. It seems that for some
reason some euro countries do not show any e®ect. Ireland, Finland and Austria
show a negative though small and insigni¯cant e®ect.
Since averaging the e®ect over the one-and-a-half years after the changeover
may downward bias the e®ect, the same model is estimated using time-varying coef-
¯cients, by simply splitting the post euro period in \0-4 months after changeover",
\4-8 months after changeover", \8-12 months after changeover", and ¯nally \12+
months after changeover". Table 10 shows that the 0-4 months e®ect (column 2) is
generally bigger and that the second period has much lower coe±cients, sometimes
negative. Nevertheless, in a di®erence-in-di®erence setup, given the high negative
22coe±cients for the non-euro countries, almost all euro countries show higher co-
e±cients. In other words, it is true that prices of low priced goods decreased in
May-August 2002, but in the euro zone some countries showed relatively strong
price stickiness. Table 13 makes this comparison explicit by taking the di®erence
between the euro-zone countries and the three euro-free countries. Except Finland
and Belgium, all coe±cients are positive and some are signi¯cant even if the control
countries' estimates are very imprecise.
It is clear that positive e®ects in the ¯rst regressions are due to the fact that
some countries seem to have systematically higher in°ation rates for low-priced
goods. Table 12 expresses the e®ect in the ¯rst 4 months period in terms of yearly
in°ation in order to facilitate the interpretation.
The other two speci¯cations that have been used are non-linear ones: b y = be°t 1
p
and b y = (b1+b2=t)1
p. The ¯rst may have a more straightforward interpretation of °,
while the second has the advantage that it can be estimated using a linear model.
The estimates are not reported, but the overall picture is unchanged. Coe±cients
drop over time. Figure 4 plots the estimated price growth versus time for b y =
(b1 + b2=t)1
p, and helps clarifying the timing e®ect. Figure 5 plots in°ation on both
price levels and time for one country, Spain. Other euro-zone countries have a similar
shape.
Summarizing, there seems to be a relationship between the inverse of prices and
in°ation, especially in Spain, Italy and France. The e®ects are small in absolute
terms, especially as prices go up, though they are big in relative terms. Remember
that overall in°ation in 2003 was quite low. This may explain why the e®ect is hard
to be measured on a more aggregated level.
There also seems to be persistence. Countries that show a signi¯cant e®ect in
23the ¯rst four months after the changeover tend to have bigger coe±cients later on
too.
Cheaper goods could still have higher price growth for reasons that are unrelated
to the euro. In order to show that the euro did matter, I link the coe±cients for
the euro zone countries to how hard consumers thought the adaptation to the new
currency was. The model predicts the coe±cients to be higher in countries where
consumers are prone to think in terms of the old currency. If a consumer thinks in
euros, my model collapses and there is no price growth, while if she bears a cost of
conversion the ¯rm will increase prices.
Also, it is clear from the discussion about the ¯rms' problem with heterogeneity
among consumers that prices will depend on the distribution of conversion costs
and therefore on the distribution of consumers that convert. On the other side, I
expect prices to depend on a series of market characteristics. In order to look into the
relationship between market structure, distribution of conversion costs and in°ation,
I match the estimated coe±cients with the Eurobarometer survey of April 2002, four
months after the changeover and with Eurostat data about retailer concentration in
the food industry (Price di®erences for supermarket goods in Europe (2002)).
Table 14 shows the correlation between the estimated coe±cients and data ex-
tracted from the Eurobarometer10. Each column represents a di®erent coe±cient.
Columns that refer to di®erent models are separated by vertical lines. For some
variables the model predicts a particular sign of the correlation. These variables are
written in bold. In fact, all correlations have the right sign!
The harder it is to remember and to compare prices, the higher the coe±cient
and, therefore, the price growth of low-priced items. Also, a higher fraction of con-
10These data are expressed in fractions, and summary statics are shown in tables 4 to 6
24sumers who always or often think in terms of the old currency and mentally convert
the price is associated with a higher price growth. Notice that the correlations for
the April-August 2002 period have, compared to all other periods, the opposite
signs. The reason is simply that the during that period the estimated coe±cients
are negative and the opposite sign re°ects that, in countries where a higher fraction
of consumers had problems with euros, prices were stickier when going down.
Figure 6 plots the post-euro adjusted coe±cient versus an index of conversion
that tries to summarize the four di®erent outcomes from the data (convert always,
often, sometimes and never). The higher the index, the more consumers convert
prices into the old currency. The picture makes it clear that Finland, Ireland and,
to a lesser extent, Belgium are outliers. Notice that these are also the countries
that showed almost no gap between perceived and actual in°ation. Ireland shows
an extremely fast learning pace. It has by far the lowest fractions of consumers
who say they have di±culties with remembering and comparing prices (table 5).
Moreover, only 7% of Irish consumer had great di±culties with euros (minimum)
and only 21% did always convert when looking at a price in euros (another minimum,
see table 4).
Finland leads to an interesting topic that is on the agenda. It has by far the
highest level of concentration in the food retail market: the market share of the ¯ve
leading groups in food retailing is around 90% in Finland while it is only 25% in
Italy and about 40-60% in the remaining countries.
Table 14 shows that, in fact, retailer and producer concentration are negatively
correlated with the coe±cients. This means that prices of low-priced goods grew
slower whenever the market was lead by few competing companies. This ¯nding is
in fact coherent with the data shown in table 6. Consumers had the impression that
25small shops were more likely to round up prices after the changeover. A possible
explanation for this is that big retailers compete on \standardized" goods. This
transparency increases the probability of ¯nding a similar or even identical good at
the competitors' shops. Also, the bigger and important the shop, the more likely
it is that mass media get interested in their pricing policies. This may additionally
discourage big chains from using the euro changeover to increase pro¯ts.
4 Conclusions
Some institutions, including Eurostat (Euro-zone annual in°ation down to 1.9%
(2003)), have found that the euro changeover had only a very limited e®ect on overall
in°ation, but in°ation is an extremely synthetic measure of price growth and may
not capture di®erentiated e®ects of the changeover on prices. To my knowledge,
excluding anecdotal evidence and descriptive studies these possible di®erentiated
e®ects have not been fully investigated.
I propose a model where consumers need some time to adapt to the new currency.
Meanwhile, they observe the price in euros which is for them a noisy signal about
the price in their old currency. The model predicts higher in°ation for lower priced
goods. It also predicts that the e®ect should vanish once the variance of the noise
goes to zero.
The data I use support the model. I analyze the relationship between price levels
and in°ation in all twelve countries who introduced the new currency and in three
countries that did not, Sweden, United Kingdom and Denmark, then I link this
relationship to consumer behavior with respect to the euro.
In three countries, Spain, Italy and France the predicted relationship is stronger
and more signi¯cant. These are also the countries that seem to have encountered
26the biggest problems with the new currency. They have higher percentages of con-
sumers that tended to think and judge the price appropriateness using their old
currency. They also have more consumers that had a hard time in remembering and
in comparing prices expressed in euros.
Another interesting ¯nding is that retailer concentration has a negative e®ect on
the estimated coe±cients of the changeover e®ect. This result seems to be con¯rmed
by the fact that most consumers coming from countries that joined the euro perceive
that prices grew more in small retailers than in big ones. The reason for this could
be that big chains are more vulnerable to stigma e®ects due to discretionary price
increases and that big chains compete on more standardized goods, for which the
comparability issue is smaller.
This paper is a step towards understanding people's behavior when faced with
nominal changes. I show that consumers have costs associated with dealing with
the new currency, which in turn has an e®ect on prices and perceived in°ation.
Hopefully it will help some countries (especially future euro members) in better
designing currency changes.
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29Table 1: Mean di®erence between standardized perceived and actual in°ation and per-
ceived in°ation before and after the euro changeover. Source: own calculations based on
Eurostat and Consumer survey.
Perceived-actual in°ation Perceived in°ation
pre post pre post
Austria -0.15 0.85 -5.77 33.11
Belgium -0.09 0.62 22.42 40.94
Denmark 0.31 -0.02 -19.63 -16.28
Finland -0.09 1.12 -14.40 -2.17
France -0.09 0.67 -0.38 43.61
Germany -0.31 1.23 19.63 63.83
Greece -0.43 0.89 23.70 43.94
Ireland 0.27 0.32 28.35 55.33
Italy 0.11 0.36 17.40 48.06
Luxembourg . -0.56 . 35.11
Netherlands -0.29 1.18 23.07 74.44
Portugal 0.15 0.40 23.38 46.44
Spain 0.04 0.50 13.00 49.39
Sweden -0.16 0.75 -28.05 -15.33
United Kingdom 0.41 -1.44 2.65 -8.44
Table 2: Euro countries and their exchange rates with the euro
Country Exchange Rate approx. error
Belgium 40.34 40 0.8%
Germany 1.96 2 -2.2%
Greece 340.75 350 {2.6%
Spain 166.39 166.67 -0.2%
France 6.56 6.67 -1.7%
Ireland 0.79 0.8 -1.6%
Italy 1936.27 2000 -3.2%
Luxembourg 40.34 40 0.8%
Netherlands 2.20 2.2 0.2%
Austria 13.76 14 -1.7%
Portugal 200.48 200 0.2%
Finland 5.95 6 -0.9%
30Table 3: Data sources
Data Eurostat EIU Cosumer Survey Eurobarometer
Type panel panel panel cross-sec.
Frequency monthly yearly monthly -
Time spanned 1/97-6/03 90-03 1/85-11/03 4/2002
Countries 17 15 17 12
# of Items 94 303 | {z } - -











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 7: Matched items and EIU identi¯cation code. Mean and standard deviation of
prices over time and countries
Eurostat EIU mean sd #obs group
Bread and cereals fwbs fwbm fcfs fcfm 2.4 0.76 210 1
Meat ®ms-fcwm 12.5 2.94 210 1
Fish and seafood ®fs-±m 12.1 3.56 210 1
Milk,cheese and eggs fmks fmkm fchs fchm fegs fegm 3.4 0.88 210 1
Oils and fats fbus-fmgm foos-fpcm 3.9 1.23 210 1
Fruit fors-fbnm 1.9 0.51 210 1
Vegetables fpts-fcrm °ts °tm 1.9 0.6 210 1
Sugar,jam,honey,chocolate and conf. fsus fsum 1.2 0.26 210 1
Co®ee,tea and cocoa ¯cs-fdcm 3.4 0.62 210 2
Mineral waters,soft drinks, juices fcos-fojm 1 0.25 210 2
Spirits asws-alcm 19.7 8.06 210 2
Wine awcs-awfm 15.1 6.75 210 2
Beer abls-abtm 1.6 0.67 210 2
Tobacco tcms-tpto 3.6 1.24 210 2
Clothing materials csws cswm 10.9 2.8 210 3
Garments cbsc-cmtm cddc cddm cwcc-ccjm cgdc-cbtm 81.6 16.07 210 3
Cleaning,repair and hire of clothing hlas-hdtm 7.7 2.48 210 3
Footwear incl repair cmsc cmsm cwsc cwsm 130.3 27.68 210 3
Actual rentals for housing rf1m-ru3h rf3m-ruh3 1,484 424 210 3
Maintenance and repair of dwelling hlds-hdlm hlbs hlbm 4.3 0.96 210 3
Water supply uwmb 39.5 14.92 197 3
Electricity uemb 118 61.24 210 3
Gas ugmb 89 42.18 183 3
Heat energy uhto 45.2 18.67 178 3
Major household appliances rctv rnfp hfps-hetm 291.7 94.36 210 3
Non-durable household goods hsps-hspm hiks hikm hbts hbtm 3.4 1.16 210 4
Domestic services and household services dhdc dhbr 9.8 5.5 210 5
Pharmaceutical products pcas pcam 10.2 4.34 210 6
Medical services; paramedical services icgp 64.6 48.51 150 6
Dental services icdt 98.7 42.94 150 6
Hospital services ixgp 64.5 27.23 150 6
Motor cars tcll-tcfh 23,531 6124 210 6
Fuels and lubricants for transport trup 1 0.16 210 6
Maintenance and repair of transport equip. ttul ttuh 217.5 62.56 210 6
Passenger transport by road ttrk ttim ttac 12 5.14 210 6
Telephone and telefax services utlr 14.5 4.92 202 7
Recording media rdcp 19.1 6.99 209 8
Cultural services rtfp rcfp 131.7 57.55 210 9
Books rpbn 11.5 2.59 209 10
Newspapers and periodicals rdln 0.9 0.31 210 10
Restaurants,cafs and the like bmtp b®s 84.5 32.4 210 1
Canteens bdrb 9.9 3.33 210 1
Accommodation services bhth bmht 208 52.74 210 1
Hairdressing salons pcmh pcwh 36.3 11.93 210 12
Other personal e®ects pcts-pclm pcrs pcrm 6.3 0.87 210 14
Insurance connected with transport tcil tcih 1,618 553 210 14
35Table 8: Means and SDs over time and countries. In°ation is expressed on yearly basis.
Source: Eurostat and EIU
Items weight SD 1/p SD #nobs ¼1¡4=2002 SD
Bread and cereals 27.67 5.91 0.50 0.13 1170 2.6% 2.3%
Meat 43.51 13.05 0.09 0.02 1170 -0.8% 2.6%
Fish and seafood 11.95 11.35 0.10 0.03 1170 4.9% 3.7%
Milk,cheese and eggs 25.02 5.78 0.34 0.08 1170 2.0% 3.0%
Oils and fats 6.68 4.00 0.30 0.07 1170 5.6% 8.6%
Fruit 12.20 4.05 0.65 0.26 1170 25.9% 21.8%
Vegetables 17.12 4.71 0.56 0.15 1170 22.5% 13.4%
Sugar,jam,... 12.50 4.14 0.92 0.19 1170 1.9% 3.2%
Co®ee,tea and cocoa 5.04 1.51 0.32 0.07 1170 -1.8% 3.1%
Mineral waters,soft drinks,... 9.23 2.65 1.11 0.27 1170 1.4% 3.5%
Spirits 5.75 4.47 0.06 0.02 1170 3.5% 3.9%
Wine 9.33 3.77 0.08 0.03 1170 4.7% 5.0%
Beer 7.69 5.43 0.73 0.25 1170 4.8% 6.8%
Tobacco 28.63 16.44 0.30 0.10 1170 8.7% 9.4%
Clothing materials 0.83 0.72 0.10 0.03 1092 0.9% 16.3%
Garments 58.53 16.46 0.01 0.00 1170 -2.4% 12.3%
Cleaning,repair of clothing 1.75 1.38 0.15 0.04 1170 5.6% 3.8%
Footwear incl repair 15.29 5.16 0.01 0.00 1170 -0.8% 10.4%
Actual rentals for housing 57.81 31.53 0.00 0.00 1170 4.3% 2.7%
Materials for maint. of dwelling 8.92 6.06 0.26 0.06 1170 1.8% 2.9%
Water supply 5.83 3.54 0.03 0.01 1170 3.4% 4.9%
Electricity 24.25 8.43 0.01 0.01 1170 3.2% 6.4%
Gas 10.47 8.18 0.02 0.04 1170 -3.3% 12.2%
Heat energy 11.55 7.00 0.02 0.01 468 2.5% 5.0%
Major household appliances 10.25 2.40 0.00 0.00 1170 -0.3% 2.4%
Non-durable household goods 11.57 4.04 0.33 0.10 1170 0.8% 1.7%
Domestic and household services 7.91 4.87 0.13 0.05 1170 8.3% 11.1%
Pharmaceutical products 8.74 5.56 0.12 0.07 1170 0.4% 11.5%
Medical & paramedical services 7.00 6.24 0.02 0.02 1170 6.4% 7.8%
Dental services 5.37 4.97 0.01 0.00 1170 0.9% 28.0%
Hospital services 3.32 4.91 0.02 0.02 1170 8.9% 9.6%
Motor cars 51.70 15.05 0.00 0.00 1170 3.1% 1.9%
Fuels and lubricants (transportation) 41.31 10.92 1.05 0.19 1170 29.0% 14.8%
Maintenance and repair (transportation) 22.34 9.36 0.01 0.00 1170 8.0% 4.2%
Passenger transport by road 7.28 5.08 0.11 0.07 1170 3.6% 7.5%
Telephone and telefax services 19.81 5.91 0.08 0.03 780 0.1% 3.3%
Recording media 4.48 1.76 0.07 0.02 1170 0.7% 3.4%
Cultural services 15.48 6.11 0.01 0.00 1170 4.6% 9.8%
Books 6.46 1.75 0.09 0.02 1170 -1.4% 12.7%
Newspapers and periodicals 10.95 3.87 1.18 0.34 1170 5.6% 6.6%
Restaurants,cafs and the like 79.81 34.69 0.02 0.00 1170 7.6% 4.1%
Canteens 7.17 4.00 0.12 0.05 1170 3.6% 5.2%
Accommodation services 13.98 10.97 0.01 0.00 1170 7.7% 18.7%
Hairdressing salons 10.29 2.97 0.03 0.01 1170 6.3% 4.4%
Other personal e®ects 4.23 2.66 0.16 0.02 1170 -0.1% 6.4%
Insurance (transportation) 4.92 2.59 0.00 0.00 1092 8.4% 9.8%
36Table 9: Estimated coe±cients (in %) of the euro-e®ect, single e®ect model. Standard
errors in parenthesis. \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of 10%, \**" one of 5%
Unadjusted model Seasonally adj. model
1/p pre € post € pre € post € # obs.
Austria 0 .02 .01 -.05 3332
(.1) (.24) (.07) (.17) .
Belgium -.03 .11 0 0 3299
(.11) (.2) (.08) (.16) .
Germany -.04 .19 -.01 .06 3411
(.08) (.18) (.06) (.12) .
Spain -.05 .26 ** -.04 .22 ** 3139
(.04) (.09) (.04) (.09) .
Finland -.02 .09 .03 -.15 3392
(.11) (.36) (.09) (.27) .
France -.06 .29 * -.04 .18 3410
(.09) (.17) (.07) (.13) .
Greece -.06 .24 -.02 .07 3058
(.18) (.28) (.11) (.23) .
Ireland .02 -.07 .04 -.14 3191
(.09) (.13) (.08) (.12) .
Italy -.04 .17 ** -.03 .13 ** 3309
(.03) (.08) (.03) (.06) .
Luxembourg -.01 .07 0 .04 3309
(.07) (.11) (.07) (.1) .
Netherlands -.05 .22 -.03 .14 3266
(.07) (.18) (.06) (.14) .
Portugal 0 .07 .01 .01 3232
(.05) (.08) (.05) (.07) .
Denmark -.02 .08 .03 -.15 3122
(.11) (.23) (.09) (.17) .
Sweden .02 -.11 .06 -.27 3208
(.12) (.23) (.1) (.2) .
United Kingdom 0 -.02 .02 -.07 3191
(.08) (.11) (.06) (.11) .
37Table 10: Estimated coe±cients (in %) of the euro-e®ect, seasonally adjusted time varying
e®ect model. Standard errors in parenthesis. \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of 10%, \**"
one of 5%
1/p pre 2002 1/02-4/02 5/02-8/02 9/02-12/02 post 2003 #obs.
Austria .01 .02 -.14 .05 -.11 3332
(.07) (.5) (.32) (.3) (.24) .
Belgium 0 .2 -.39 * .07 .11 3299
(.08) (.47) (.23) (.21) (.31) .
Germany -.01 .44 -.25 -.05 .08 3411
(.06) (.34) (.18) (.15) (.22) .
Spain -.04 .64 ** .15 .09 .04 3139
(.04) (.2) (.12) (.14) (.18) .
Finland .03 .22 -.69 * .23 -.31 3392
(.09) (.83) (.41) (.36) (.39) .
France -.04 .4 -.1 .07 .32 3410
(.07) (.35) (.15) (.13) (.3) .
Greece -.02 .05 .07 -.06 .22 3058
(.11) (.47) (.6) (.3) (.42) .
Ireland .04 .09 -.01 .06 -.58 ** 3191
(.08) (.21) (.28) (.19) (.24) .
Italy -.03 .37 ** -.02 .16 ** .05 3309
(.03) (.17) (.08) (.06) (.13) .
Luxembourg 0 .28 -.04 .02 -.06 3309
(.07) (.18) (.12) (.17) (.25) .
Netherlands -.03 .45 -.03 -.01 .14 3266
(.06) (.3) (.22) (.39) (.21) .
Portugal .01 -.07 -.07 .09 .08 3232
(.05) (.12) (.17) (.07) (.13) .
Denmark .03 .49 -.25 -.13 -.59 3122
(.09) (.39) (.29) (.24) (.36) .
Sweden .06 -.05 -.39 -.21 -.4 3208
(.1) (.57) (.29) (.3) (.38) .
United Kingdom .02 .11 -.63 * .09 .06 3191
(.06) (.16) (.32) (.15) (.18) .
38Table 11: Estimated yearly in°ation (in %) due to the euro in the post euro period
given the coe±cients of the single e®ect model with seasonally adjusted data for di®erent
price levels
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=5
Austria -0.63 -0.31 -0.21 -0.16 -0.13
Belgium 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Germany 0.69 0.35 0.23 0.17 0.14
Spain 2.66 1.32 0.88 0.66 0.53
Finland -1.76 -0.88 -0.59 -0.44 -0.35
France 2.21 1.10 0.73 0.55 0.44
Greece 0.90 0.45 0.30 0.22 0.18
Ireland -1.69 -0.85 -0.57 -0.42 -0.34
Italy 1.62 0.81 0.54 0.40 0.32
Luxembourg 0.50 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.10
Netherlands 1.64 0.82 0.54 0.41 0.33
Portugal 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03
Denmark -1.78 -0.89 -0.60 -0.45 -0.36
Sweden -3.16 -1.59 -1.06 -0.80 -0.64
United Kingdom -0.88 -0.44 -0.29 -0.22 -0.18
39Table 12: Estimated yearly in°ation (in %) due to the euro in the ¯rst 4 months of 2002.
The estimates are from the time varying e®ect model with seasonally adjusted data for
di®erent price levels in euro
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=5
Austria 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.06
Belgium 2.42 1.20 0.80 0.60 0.48
Germany 5.44 2.69 1.78 1.34 1.07
Spain 7.96 3.91 2.59 1.94 1.55
Finland 2.63 1.31 0.87 0.65 0.52
France 4.90 2.42 1.61 1.20 0.96
Greece 0.55 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.11
Ireland 1.08 0.54 0.36 0.27 0.22
Italy 4.55 2.25 1.50 1.12 0.90
Luxembourg 3.37 1.67 1.11 0.83 0.66
Netherlands 5.55 2.74 1.82 1.36 1.09
Portugal -0.86 -0.43 -0.29 -0.22 -0.17
Denmark 6.05 2.98 1.98 1.48 1.18
Sweden -0.55 -0.28 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11
United Kingdom 1.38 0.69 0.46 0.34 0.27
40Table 13: Di®erence in di®erence estimators for the April-August 2002 period. Each
column represents a di®erent comparison country. Standard errors in parenthesis. \*"
indicates a signi¯cance level of 10%, \**" one of 5%
- Denmark - Sweden - United Kingdom
Austria .1 .25 .48
(.43) (.43) (.45)
Belgium -.14 0 .24
(.37) (.37) (.4)
Germany 0 .14 .38
(.34) (.34) (.37)
Spain .4 .54 * .78 **
(.31) (.31) (.35)
Finland -.44 -.3 -.06
(.5) (.5) (.52)
France .15 .29 .53
(.32) (.33) (.36)
Greece .32 .46 .7
(.67) (.67) (.68)
Ireland .24 .38 .62
(.4) (.4) (.43)
Italy .23 .37 .61 *
(.3) (.3) (.33)
Luxembourg .2 .35 .58 *
(.31) (.31) (.34)
Netherlands .21 .36 .59
(.36) (.36) (.39)
Portugal .17 .32 .56
(.33) (.34) (.37)
41Table 14: Correlation between the estimated coe±cients of the euro-e®ect and consumer
behavior towards the euro (fraction of sample responding:...). Source: Eurobarometer and
Eurostat. The producer concentration is calculated by the Internal Market DG based on
ACNielsen data.
post € post €(adj.) 1/02-4/02 5/02-8/02 9/02-12/02
post € 1.00
post €(adj.) 0.88 1.00
1-4/02 0.68 0.68 1.00
5-8/02 0.27 0.59 0.16 1.00
9-12/02 -0.27 -0.29 0.00 -0.48 1.00
Hard to remember prices 0.34 0.28 0.29 -0.41 0.30
Hard to compare prices 0.38 0.19 0.21 -0.53 0.22
Always think in Lire 0.69 0.47 0.44 -0.20 0.12
Often think in Lire 0.29 0.16 0.59 -0.51 0.33
Sometimes think in Lire -0.73 -0.53 -0.65 0.28 -0.21
Never think in Lire -0.48 -0.21 -0.56 0.63 -0.33
Always convert 0.80 0.61 0.37 -0.08 0.11
Often convert 0.31 0.09 0.51 -0.66 0.36
Sometimes convert -0.68 -0.44 -0.40 0.33 -0.19
Never convert -0.66 -0.45 -0.52 0.43 -0.28
Dual p:look at Euro only -0.29 -0.32 -0.42 0.31 -0.35
Dual p:look at Lira only 0.03 0.10 0.25 -0.16 -0.21
Dual p:was essential 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.08
Dual p:was useless 0.07 0.01 -0.37 0.35 -0.53
Hard to use coins -0.20 -0.12 0.04 -0.14 -0.33
Hard to use notes -0.02 0.25 -0.13 0.39 -0.20
Dislike Euro 0.03 -0.26 0.05 -0.45 -0.08
Uncomfortable with Euro 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.15 -0.56
Permanent di±c. with € 0.30 0.35 -0.07 0.02 0.25
Overall no di±c. with € -0.44 -0.48 -0.03 -0.22 -0.36
Prices were rounded up 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.40 -0.65
Retailer concentration -0.23 -0.48 -0.03 -0.75 0.22
Producer concentration -0.64 -0.64 -0.84 -0.08 0.11
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Figure 1: Perceived vs. real in°ation before \0" and after the changeover \1" in countries
where there is a clear change
Notes: Austria AT, Belgium BE, Germany DE, Greece EL, Spain ES, France FR, Ireland IE, Italy IT, Netherlands
NL, Portugal PT
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Figure 2: Perceived vs. real in°ation before \0" and after \1" the changeover in euro and
non-euro countries where no change is visible
Notes: Finland FI, Ireland IE, Sweden SW, Denmark DK, United Kingdom UK


























































Figure 3: Simulations of equation (2) for di®erent values of ¾ and k versus the OLS ¯t
based on equation (7).





































Figure 4: Predicted price growth (in %) for price equal to 1,2, 5 and 10 (decreasing) using
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Conversion
Figure 6: Index of conversion to the euro vs. the estimated seasonally adjusted coe±cients
Notes: Austria AT, Belgium BE, Germany DE, Greece GR, Spain ES, France FR, Ireland IE, Italy IT, Luxembourg
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Figure 7: Index of conversion to the euro vs. the time varying estimated seasonally
adjusted coe±cients
Notes: Austria AT, Belgium BE, Germany DE, Greece GR, Spain ES, France FR, Ireland IE, Italy IT, Luxembourg
LU, Netherlands NL, Portugal PT, Finland FI, Sweden SW, Denmark DK, United Kingdom UK
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